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Choosing between internal and non-internal R&D activities: some technological and
economic factors
Abstract This paper evaluates some of the technological and economic factors that underlie
the choice between in-house R&D, R&D alliances and outsourcing. We recount the reasons
for the growth in non-internal activities, and explain why these are not as prevalent for R&D
as other value-adding activities, and highlight that outsourcing is most often undertaken
where multiple, substitutable sources are available. We then develop two frameworks. First, a
static framework is developed, which evaluates the choice of mode based on a firm's
distribution of competencies, and their strategic importance. Second, a dynamic framework is
developed that demonstrates how the static framework differs depending on whether the firm
is engaged in pre-paradigmatic, paradigmatic or post-paradigmatic sectors.  We also consider
the effect of new technologies being introduced to a firm's portfolio of competencies.
Introduction
Over the past decade, there is growing evidence to suggest that firms no longer rely
exclusively on their internal R&D activities to maintain their technological competitiveness.
This has been highlighted most recently by Veugelers (1997), Veugelers and Cassiman
(1999), Hagedoorn (1996), Narula and Hagedoorn (1999), Archibugi and Iammarino (1999),
among others. This development, it has been argued, in part reflects techno- and economic-
globalisation, whereby there is an increasing similarity (and growing capital intensity) in the
types of technologies across countries of the Triad. This is a result, inter alia, of growing
cross-border competition, which has also led to reduced opportunities for profits, in the face
of higher costs in maintaining technological assets to remain globally competitive (Archibugi
and Michie 1998).
Our use of the term 'non-internal' is a deliberate one, and is intended to include both
external activities (arms-length relationships such as licensing, R&D contracts, outsourcing -
and other customer-supplier relationships) and quasi-external activity (such as strategic
alliances, which is taken to include a myriad of organisational modes [Narula and Hagedoorn
1999]). Non-internal activities, apart from the obvious benefits of exploring new areas and
instigating radical change, have the advantage of being a 'reversible' form of investment
(Gambardella and Torrisi 1998). The capital needed is smaller, and the risks are substantially
reduced, and in case of failure or organisational crisis, limited damage is inflicted on the
primary operations of the firm.  Nonetheless, the tacit nature of innovation, and the risks
associated with loss of technological competitiveness, encourage a high level of in-house
R&D activity.2
Our starting point in the current paper is a synthesis of the seminal work of inter alia
Teece (1986, 1996) and Granstand, Patel and Pavitt (1996). We develop an understanding of
some of the most significant technological factors that determine the kinds of non-internal
R&D activities undertaken by multi-technology manufacturing firms. The choice between
internal and non-internal R&D activities is determined by (a) distribution and kinds of
competencies that the firms possesses, (b) the evolution of individual technologies, and the
changing characteristics of the technology as it progresses from a new technology to a mature
one, (c) strategic and economic issues relating to the competitive environment.
Although the paper primarily describes a conceptual framework to understand how a
firm decides between internal, external, and quasi-external technology development, it has
been refined and synthesised on the basis of a number of interviews with 32 senior R&D
managers of European-based technology-intensive firms. We have illustrated our arguments
with anecdotal evidence based on these interviews. Appendix A gives details of our interview
methodology and limitations of the data.
Understanding the reasons for the success and failure of cooperative activities has far-
reaching implications from both a managerial and policy perspective. The 'right' mix of
internal and non-internal R&D activities can prevent firms not only from over- or under-
investing in R&D, but also help to maintain their long-term competitive position.
The next section discusses some of the relationships between the multi-technology
firm and the growth of non-internal R&D. The third section attempts to differentiate between
alliances and outsourcing. The fourth section examines the static issues underlying the choice
of mode and the distribution of competences. We then discuss the evolution of technologies,
and the dynamic choices that firms must make. The final section develops some conclusions,
highlights the caveats, and develops an agenda for future research.
The growth of the multi-technology firm and non-internal R&D
The growing need for firms - particularly in technology intensive sectors -  to have
multiple technological competences is by now axiomatic. Several contributions, notably by
Granstand and associates (see e.g., Granstand 1998, Granstand, Patel and Pavitt 1996) have
noted the growing technological diversification of companies, and more recently, that this is
associated with a reduction in product diversification over time. Even where products are
mono-technology-based, the processes used to manufacture them often utilise several
technologies. Furthermore, within a given technology, there are several technological
paradigms at play, as firms base products on the current dominant design, yet develop nascent3
technologies with the long-term intention of replacing the current technology with a new
dominant design.
The increasing cross-fertilisation of technologies across disciplines and resultant
broader portfolio of competences has become fundamental to the competitiveness of
technology-based firms.  There has also, however, been a concurrent increase in competition,
due, inter alia, to the liberalisation of markets, and the reduction of transaction and
transportation costs. This has led to a decline in the profit margins due to increased cross-
border competition and barriers to entry (Buckley and Casson 1998).  As such, the increased
costs of requiring more technological competences is not offset by greater profits, but quite
the opposite. In addition, R&D in new technologies has been seen to be increasingly capital-
intensive. So, the need to reduce costs (and maintain profits), while maintaining the firm's
technological assets has become an important managerial balancing act.
The attempt to understand the reasons behind a firm's choice between external and
internal technological development is not new. The work of Teece (1986) presents a
pioneering analysis of this issue, which builds on work by Abernathy and Utterback (1978),
Dosi (1982) among others, and further developed by Pisano (1990), Arora and Gambardella
(1990) and Henderson and Clark (1990).  More recent work include Granstand et al (1996),
Granstand (1998), Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998), Veugelers and Cassiman (1998), Croisier
(1998), Lowe and Taylor (1998), Tidd and Trehwalla (1997) and Gambardella and Torrisi
(1998).
One of the reasons attributed to the growth of non-internal activity has been the
decline in transaction costs for external or quasi-externalised relationships, relative to
complete internalisation, not just for R&D, but for most aspects of value adding activity. As
firms have responded to this new scenario, there has been a dis-integration of certain firms in
particular industries, as they seek flexibility and lower risk, which have hitherto preferred
vertical integration. Some notice has been made of the process of dis-investment, that, appears
to have become quite commonplace during the last decade (Benito 1997). However, this has
happened only to a limited extent in the case of R&D. (estimates suggest that between 10 and
15% of agreements involve R&D, although this figure has increased three fold since the
1980s
1). Why do firms demonstrate a lower propensity to use non-internal sourcing for R&D?
The reasons for its relative lack of popularity have to do with the nature of the innovation
process. First, because the innovation process is highly uncertain, and there are considerable
                                                       
1 These estimates are based on the results from two different surveys, Culpan and Costelac (1993), and Gugler
and Pasquier (1996).4
costs in negotiating and enforcing contracts. Second, the large tacit component of innovation
means that through external sourcing, firms are only able to get codified results, not the
accumulated, person-embodied skills. Third, the partially-public good nature of technology
also means that there is considerable opportunity for technological leakage and/or
opportunistic behaviour by collaborators (Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). Fourth,
appropriability of innovation varies widely, both by country and by industry, which further
increases the possibility of loss of key assets. In other words, the uncertainty of the process,
the high costs of transaction and risk of losing strategic assets crucial to the survival of the
firm inhibit non-internal activity. As Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998) point out, the advantages
of internal R&D activity are also its limitations. Firms are path-dependent, and find it costly
to break away from existing routines towards radically new or different concepts. There are
additional costs involved in switching trajectories which may impede organisational change
and exacerbate the level of uncertainty and therefore economic risk
2.
Can the growth of non-internal R&D activity be explained simply by imperfections in
the strategic and economic organisation of internal R&D? The answer is complex, and is
associated with our use of the term 'non-internal' to include both external activities (arms-
length relationships such as licensing, R&D contracts, outsourcing - and other customer-
supplier relationship) and quasi-external activity (such as strategic alliances, which are most-
often undertaken between competitors). Non-internal activities, apart from the obvious
benefits of exploring new areas and instigating radical change, have the advantage of being a
'reversible' form of investment (Gambardella and Torrisi 1998). The capital needed is smaller,
and the risks are substantially reduced, and in case of failure or organisational crisis, limited
damage is inflicted on the primary operations of the firm.
Fully external activities are not novel - it has, for instance, been accepted for quite
some time that universities and state-subsidised institutes represent an important source of
basic research for commercial firms. Indeed, it is the development of horizontal collaboration
between competitors that is relatively new, particularly in strategic technology partnering,
where the growth has been almost exponential (see e.g., Hagedoorn 1996). Nonetheless, as
the survey by Tidd and Trehwalla (1997) illustrates, external sourcing of technology remains
a larger phenomenon than strategic alliances. However, it is difficult to quantify the
differences in growth between external and quasi-external R&D, because it is hard, if not
impossible, to estimate the potential value of quasi-external agreements to the firms involved
                                                       
2 This line of reasoning is well-developed - see e.g., Nelson and Winter (1982) Cyert and March (1963), Mitchell
and Singh (1996) among others.5
(Narula 1999). First, because R&D is tacit, and has a long-term horizon: the value of the
research cannot be estimated ex-ante. Even where there is a short-term horizon and the
objective is non-tacit (say, establishing technological standards), and the resulting output is
patentable or licensable, technologies cannot always be correlated with products (and thus
sales). Second, even where firms can place a value on an agreement, they have no incentive to
make such information available, either to each other, or to the public. The evidence from our
interviews indicates that in terms of expenditures, firms spend between 15 and 25% of the
R&D budget in technology outsourcing, and 5 to 10% in collaboration, although the value of
the latter may well be greater, because of the strategic importance of the areas where alliances
are undertaken. At the same time, as we discuss below, it is relatively easy to determine the
value of outsourcing. It is important to note that alliances are a complex organisational form
and require considerable resources to maintain collaborative activity, compared with more
arms-length agreements such as outsourcing. Tidd and Trehwalla (1998) for instance, note in
their survey of Japanese and British technology acquisition strategies, that only 13% of their
firms considered alliances as an significant technology source. It is worth noting too, that
horizontal alliances, in the sense of collaboration between competitors is a relatively small
phenomenon. Firms partner with competitors only with the greatest of caution, and only on
specific and carefully defined projects.
Standardisation, cost and industrial organisation
The growth of non-internal activity has in part occurred because of a redefinition of
the boundaries of the firm (in the Coasian sense) such that it is increasingly cheaper to
undertake such activities outside the firm. Clearly this has not happened on an equal basis for
quasi-external and fully-external agreements, particularly for R&D activities. As we have
highlighted earlier, firms in our sample engage in three times as many outsourcing agreements
than they do alliances. The answer to this discrepancy lies in a simple fact: standardisation of
technologies across borders due to technological convergence has led to a decline in the
production costs of clearly defined inputs to the value-adding process, as well as the
transaction costs associated with their acquisition. By 'clearly-defined' we refer to codifiable,
non-tacit inputs to the production process.
Here it is cogent to distinguish between vertical-chain-related activity and horizontal
activity. The growth of vertical relationships (essentially customer-supplier agreements) is
governed by the ability of firms to monitor the quality of external suppliers due to improved
communications. The convergence of technological standards in 'generic' production6
technologies creates alternatives to direct control, since quality requirements are similar, and
if these inputs do not meet specifications the shortcomings can be quickly identified and
addressed without costly time delays. Horizontal alliances, particularly with competitors, are
generally undertaken for strategic reasons, with cost issues playing a secondary role (Narula
and Hagedoorn 1999). The principal reasons for alliance activity is to maintain closer control
of the activities of the collaborator, and to enhance and monitor the transfer of technology
between the partner. If the knowledge to be transferred is well-defined and available from
multiple sources, complex organisational cooperation modes such as alliances are
unnecessary
3. It follows, therefore, that R&D alliances take place in diametrically opposed
circumstances than outsourcing. The relationships in horizontal agreements tend to reflect a
more complex strategic intent, and arms-length transactions do not in general provide this.
External acquisition of technology is most easily done when the technology behind the
product is codifiable and standardised and for which multiple non-distinguishable sources of
these inputs are available. The same argument holds true for R&D activity, since R&D output
is partly tacit, externalisation of R&D means that the firm only gets the codified results, not
the accumulated person-embodied skills. As has been noted elsewhere, even where firms
outsource, they maintain a minimum level of in-house capacity in those technologies in order
to decipher and utilise them (Veugelers 1997). In other words, R&D outsourcing is only
undertaken where doing so is cost-effective AND does not threaten the competitive
advantages of the company. Having a single source or single buyer may prove to be most
cost-effective, but it is generally accepted that low costs do not always translate to the best
technology. Moreover, dependency on a single supplier (or a single customer) represents a
bottle-neck, and the problems associated with a monopolistic/monopsonistic pricing.
Furthermore, there are positive technological externalities of multiple sources of innovation.
Pratt and Whitney, for instance, has several suppliers of turbine intakes, even though they
have in-house design and manufacturing facilities. External bids are always sought for new
products from all parties, as a way of establishing a benchmark for quality and costs.
Innovations from all the various suppliers are all absorbed into the final product.
Where either the know-how for the inputs is unique and non-substitutable (either
because it is proprietary and firm-specific, or it is location-specific), or it is tacit and non-
codifiable, cost based issues become less relevant, and strategic (and resource) considerations,
(such as core competences) take on greater importance. We examine these issues separately.
                                                       
3 However, there are often other factors why firms may decide to undertake alliances. For instance, there may be
several other alliances between firms in other technologies, for which alliances maybe necessary.7
When the input necessary is unique. If the input is firm-specific (for instance,
Windows operating system), the cost becomes less relevant
4 and the resource availability
becomes important. The development of new software is generally dependent on the features
to be incorporated into the next version of Windows. In these cases, the relationship between
the software firm and the Microsoft is much more strategic, and requires certain resources to
be devoted to the interaction between the two firms.  As such, the software firm is involved in
an alliance which determines the long term product-market positioning of at least one of the
firms.  Where the resource is not completely internalised by the firm, but is particular to a
location or a region, a similar scenario applies, only that this affects production costs more
than transaction costs. There is a well-developed literature on the role of national (and
regional) systems of innovation and their influence on the location of companies (see e.g.,
Edquist 1997, Lundvall 1992). This may either be to benefit from socio-technological inputs
such as educational establishments, infrastructure, or simply to exploit economies of
agglomeration, and to seek possible spillovers. Where such inputs are unique, that is, the
resource is unavailable elsewhere, and proximity to its source is necessary, the choice of
location is production-cost-independent (Sachwald 1998). It is to be noted that although the
cost issue may be secondary in the case of an immobile location-specific factors, it does not
mean that it is unimportant
5. Since these resources are crucial to the survival of the firm, they
take on a strategic importance that clearly outweighs any cost-savings that might derive from
outsourcing.  Where the input is unique, some of this uncertainty can be reduced by
considering quasi-hierarchical agreements such as alliances.
Tacit or non-codifiable inputs. Because of their nature, certain inputs to the value
adding process are less clearly defined. This is especially the case with most innovatory
activities, but is also true for specialised resources where innovation is not involved, but the
final product is tacit in nature. Therefore, it is much more difficult to outsource these aspects
of the production process, because it is hard to specify the quality of the resource. Identifying
a supplier who would be able to produce it may be difficult, since its nature is difficult to
specify
6. Where the product has a high level of tacitness, property rights will most likely be
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5 Take for instance the case where proximity in necessary, such as in a customer-supplier agreement that requires
just-in-time delivery. Where cooperative agreements are undertaken in such a case, such decisions are mainly
cost-based.
6 Cowan and Foray (1997) argue that while codification is never complete, the extent to which knowledge is
codified depends on the costs and benefits of doing so.  Although new technologies have lowered the costs of
codification, certain kinds of knowledge are too expensive to codify, simply because the information is useful to
only a small number of users.8
unclear. In other words, the market for such resources are hard to establish. Where such
supplier firms do exist and property rights are well-defined, they are able to charge monopoly
rates, since they have access to unique resources, and price comparisons are thus impossible.
In addition though, closer cooperation than might be provided by networks is also necessary,
because firstly, the contracting firm is itself unsure of the nature of the resources, and must
monitor the activities of the supplier firm more closely. As Cantwell and Santangelo (1999)
discuss, greater tacit and uncodified knowledge require closer, face-to-face interaction.
Secondly, the customer would like to avoid the potential loss of his assets to the supplier
company. In such cases, outsourcing is the least preferred option.
Distributed competences and the choice between internal and non-internal activity: a
static view
The technological competencies and assets of a firm can be classified into several
distinct kinds. Not all activities are equally crucial to the competitiveness of the firm.
Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998) propose a two way classification of core and complementary
technologies, while Granstand et al (1996) view these as being of four types. We have utilised
the Granstand et al framework that the competences of technology based firms can be viewed
as being of four types (figure 1).
*****FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE****
Firms have distinctive competences, which command a high share of technical
resources of a company. These form the 'core' of the firm, which define the technological
profile of the firm and its competitiveness. Then there are the niche sectors, which are
technologies which the firm possesses some level of expertise, but these areas are intrinsically
small in terms of their profile, and in terms of the resources they command. These
technological fields are generally complementary to their distinctive competencies.
Marginal/peripheral technologies are sectors which were important to the firm in the past, or
are expected to become important in the future, in which limited resources are invested, and
where the firm has no distinct technological advantages. Finally background competences
enable firms to coordinate and benefit from technical change in the supply chain, which are
essential to the competitiveness of the firm, and it ability to efficiently utilise its other, more
'crucial' competences.  Although these are equally crucial, and significantly determine the9
competitiveness of a firm, they only utilise a small percentage of the firm's technology
resources. They are, however, an important part of the firms technological assets.
****FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE****
We postulate that Figure 2 shows how the choice between in-house R&D, alliances
and outsourcing relate to the 4-way classification of Figure 1 from a static perspective. Firms
in our interviews were asked to discuss the importance of their technological activities within
this 4-way classification, in terms of competencies and technological assets. Then, their
primary internal, external and collaborative efforts were identified according to the areas of
in-house R&D, technological collaboration and outsourcing. Figure 2 presents the generalised
results of our interviews. Firms will, ceteris paribus, prefer to undertake innovative activities
in their distinctive competences (quadrant I) through in-house R&D. Although there is
considerable overlap in the case of quadrant III and IV (figure 2), broadly speaking these
competences are strategically less significant, and can be undertaken through alliances
However, the strategic importance of these technologies determines to what extent their
development can be externalised. This, in turn, is determined by the extent to which the
technology is tacit, the extent to which collaboration is required to utilise it, and to what
extent the partners activities need to be monitored.
Background competences (Quadrant II) are, by and large, the area where outsourcing
is primarily used. In general, it would seem firms prefer to undertake research in their
distinctive competencies in-house as much as possible. There is, however, considerable
overlap in the use of in-house R&D and alliances for niche competences, and between
outsourcing and alliances in marginal/peripheral competencies. In general, there is
considerable idiosyncratic  behaviour of firms. Take for instance the case of 'firm A' (see
appendix A for brief description), which considers alliances in their niche sectors
unacceptably risky:
"These competencies are too important to us….we have spent many years
building our strength in these sectors….frankly we have world class
competences……I am loathe to consider letting anyone near our technology. We only
use alliances [in these areas] if we have to."
The differences in the propensity varied according to industry and size (discussed
further in the next section). The use of alliances in connection with niche sectors was, in
general, associated with firms that had limited R&D facilities and/or considered that there was10
a large technological gap between their technological competencies and the market leaders.
The issue of size seems to be a very significant one. Firms with limited resources considered
alliances as a way of extending their technological competences. For instance, one medical
equipment manufacturer ('Firm A') did not have the resources to invest in the next generation
of displays. Although LCD technology has become more mature over the last 5 years, it
remains capital-intensive, and proprietary technology at the forefront rests with a handful of
companies.  It therefore sought an alliance with a US company which is a market leader in
medical equipment, many times their size. However, the US firm did not currently compete
with them in their particular product segment, and agreed to share the technology and to
distribute their products in the US. As a manager pointed out,
"It’s a risk [to ally with such a large player], but the cost of developing our
own display systems would use up almost our entire R&D budget for a couple of
years…and our old product range was [beginning to look] old. [They] have the
technology lying around, because they have more people in their R&D facilities than
we have in our entire company…[if they wanted to] they could buy us out, whether
we had a partnership with them or not [so it doesn’t matter whether or not we partner
with them]."
****FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE****
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of competences for 'firm B' which represents an
amalgam of the competencies of four measuring and control equipment manufacturers.  The
decision to use alliances is determined by additional issues apart from the protection of
competitive advantages. Firm B's scale of production is in the thousands, far below the
minimum efficient scale for active component manufacture. The manufacturing and design of
specialised active components is therefore an area where it is impractical for the firm to
maintain in-house facilities. It makes economic sense, therefore, to provide the performance
specifications to a specialised component manufacturer.  Nonetheless, because this is an input
that is crucial to the competitive advantage of the firm, it is designed in close cooperation with
the engineers in firm B.
The manufacture and design of printed circuit boards was left entirely to external
firms, and completely outsourced. Apart from quality control checks when the completed
boards were delivered, no attempts were made to monitor or control PCB production and
design. Likewise casings, mountings, and the design of power supply units (which have
become highly standardised and are now essentially off-the-shelf products) were also11
completely outsourced. For all these products there were several suppliers available. As a
principle,
"we use more than one supplier, our products are based on several boards.
Each supplier produces only one board, because we don’t want any supplier to have
access to our complete product. We might be able to get a lower price, but we don’t
want to be in a position that the supplier is able to become a competitor. Non-
disclosure agreements aren't enough."
As we have earlier suggested, all the managers interviewed agreed that the volume of
outsourcing has expanded considerably over the last two decades. They considered that the
growth of outsourcing has a lot to do with the process of globalisation, particularly in terms of
a) ease of enforcement of contracts and the ability of firms to monitor the activities of
suppliers due to ICTs, and b) the increased competition due to the entry of several emerging
Asian economies in technology-intensive sectors.
"The world is a much smaller place…we travel to visit our major suppliers in
Taiwan and America at least three or four times each [every year], and they ship us
samples by DHL for us to test."
It is worth noting that not all firms based their decisions on rational economic or
strategic issues. One medium sized firm ('Firm A'), had, in the early 1990s, started
manufacturing trauma and intensive-care equipment. As their first generation products
reached the end of their life cycle by 1997, the firm was faced with a dilemma. It had
continued to maintain a relatively low R&D intensity (and a correspondingly small in-house
R&D staff) despite adding more high-tech products, and therefore decided to completely out-
source its new generation of products, but in order to maintain what they saw as their
competitive advantage, the head of R&D decided to outsource the design and manufacture of
different sub-assemblies separately, co-ordinated by firm A's research lab. Partly because the
manufacture of the sub-assemblies was done by different contractors than the design, and
there was little, if any, direct coordination between the design and manufacturing teams, the
final assembled products failed to work within specifications. The product release was
delayed by a year, as the in-house R&D had to engineer changes, modification and further
testing. Firm A has now responded by establishing a policy against outsourcing of any aspect
of the design and manufacture process. It has now established a strategic alliance with a12
competitor (which has a different geographic focus) to develop its next generation of
products.
A cautionary attitude towards alliances is widespread, especially among smaller firms.
'Firm D' outsources almost all aspects of its manufacturing activities, and represents an
extreme approach. They have a policy against strategic alliances. It does, however, invest
considerable time in selecting supplier firms, so that their customer-supplier relationship is
very close-knit. Small supplier firms are selected so that there is little chance of their being
able to reverse-engineer their product, and of becoming a competitor. Long and complex
contractual agreements are made with each firm which have non-performance penalties and
clauses, and the production activity is monitored regularly by visits from the R&D department
of firm D.
As we have earlier emphasised, there are considerable variation by firms, due not just
to differences in strategy and history, but also by industry. The next section discusses how
technologies evolve, and how this changes the choice of organisational mode over time.
The dynamic view: The evolution of technological paradigms
We turn our attention to the dynamics aspects, and in particular the issues relating to the
evolution of technologies, and its effect on the decision to internalise innovatory activities.
Our primary emphasis is on explaining how the choice of mode is affected by (a) the stage of
evolution of the technological paradigm, and (b) how the introduction of new innovations to
the existing portfolio of a firm affects its static choices highlighted in the previous section.
Our discussion of this evolution is not new, and builds on earlier notions of this process
developed by Dosi (1982) among others. Teece (1986, 1996), in particular, has utilised these
ideas to build an framework regarding its effects on the internalisation issue, upon which we
build.
As Teece (1986) has argued, the maturity of the technology, and its characteristics,
determines the extent to which the innovation process can be internalised. Obviously, every
technological trajectory of each individual firm is unique, since the innovation process is
path-dependent on previous innovation. In other words, there are cognitive limits on what
firms can and cannot do (Pavitt 1998). Nonetheless, once a 'dominant design paradigm' has
been established, firms innovate around this paradigm, with the intention of improving it, or
replacing it. They therefore are dependent on the last-best (i.e., state-of-the-art) innovation. If
a firm is engaged in developing an innovation in a given technological paradigm, it must13
strive to improve (or at least take into account) not its own last-best innovation, but the last-
best innovation that has been patented, or that is the dominant design on the market
7, even if
this was created by another firm. Thus its path-dependency is always tempered by the state-
of-the-art, and this means that roughly speaking technological trajectories of different firms
within any given technological paradigm are similar. At the risk of over-simplifying,
technologies (within a given paradigm) evolve through different stages, and these can be
viewed as being determined by two factors: the level of uncertainty in the nature of the
technology and the speed of technical change within it.  These two factors also determine
other issues which affect the internalisation or externalisation of R&D, such as the level of
appropriability. Figure 4 places these two dimensions into context, using a 2x2 matrix. The
arrows indicate the typical time-trend of evolution of a technology, from quadrant A to D.
****FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE*****
The concept of uncertainty within the innovation process is well-understood, and we
shall not delve into it in detail. In general, the newer the sector, the closer it is to 'basic
research' in the sense that the outcome of the research will lead to fundamental changes in
knowledge, rather than technology. Such 'blue sky' or pre-paradigmatic research generally has
a higher level of uncertainty than research within a defined paradigm. As the technology
becomes diffused and codified (and a paradigm defined), the level of uncertainty drops.
The rate of technical change is determined not just by the level of uncertainty of
technological change, but the number of possible directions in which it can develop, because
there are multiple alternatives to any innovation. Thus, while technological change may not
always be perceptible or discrete, it is continuous. It is not however determined by one
company or idea but numerous path-dependent solutions being developed independently by
several innovators or would-be innovators. In other words, while the innovation being
developed by one company is unique to it, it represents one of many possible solutions to a
technological hurdle. Whether it belongs to the dominant paradigm is irrelevant, because
modifications to the dominant design continue, as well as attempts to supplant it with a new
design.
Although the rate of technical change is not linearly related to uncertainty, it is
nonetheless determined by the reduction of uncertainty, as a dominant design is established.
                                                       
7 Numerous examples of technically sub-optimal innovations defining the technological trajectory exist  (e.g.,
Betamax vs. VHS, Macintosh vs. PC). Perhaps the best documented example is of the QWERTY keyboard
(David 1985)14
However, as we have earlier emphasised, in addition to innovation within the dominant
design, there are attempts to supplant the dominant paradigm with new paradigms. These may
occur directly, or because of changes in complementary technologies. As Teece (1986)
observes, complementary technologies may evolve together, and affect each other, depending
on whether the technologies are co-specialised, specialised or generic. We illustrate this point
by taking the example of the further miniaturisation of integrated circuits, and two related
technologies: that of fabrication technology and the materials technology, which are co-
specialised technologies (developments in one restrict and/or define developments in the
other). Within the existing fabrication technological paradigm, the solution is to use lower
wavelengths in the etching process. The current technology relies on lens-based tools which
use deep ultra-violet light, which may be regarded as generic and paradigmatic. Markets for
this innovation already exist, and these markets operate efficiently. The nature of the property
rights of innovation are clear. Technological change is rapid, and the dominant paradigm is
well-established. Such a technology could be classified in quadrant C in Figure 1. However,
simply reducing the wavelength further to get further miniaturisation is a limited option, since
traditional optics become opaque below certain wavelengths. There are at least four different
technological trajectories being proposed, and being pursued by various consortia. IBM and
Canon plan to replace this with X-rays, while Siemens is working on ion-beams. Intel,
Motorola and AMD are working with soft-X-rays
8. The technology is undefined, but change
is rapid, because the technologies are clear, and the outcome desired is a matter of 'when' and
'who' rather than 'if'. It only remains to be seen which of these technological solutions will be
dominant. Such a technology is in quadrant B, and will move rapidly into a paradigmatic state
(quadrant C).
However, technologies do not necessarily evolve endogenously. Complementary and
related technologies also evolve, and can change the distribution of firm's competences,
especially where new innovations or completely new technologies are introduced in the
market place. Teece's distinction between systemic and autonomous innovation is critical
here. Autonomous innovations fit comfortably into existing technologies and competences,
while systemic innovations significantly effect the existing competences of a firm, and the
distribution of its competences. For instance, a company engaged in the production of
fabricated metal equipment will find an innovation in adhesive technology to be peripherally
related to its industry, since improvements in epoxy-based adhesives represent an option to
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welding, and at may best represent a niche competence. It does not, however, systemically
affect its operations, nor is likely too, even if adhesives eventually replace welding.
In the case of integrated circuit fabrication, developments in new materials for
insulation materials, semiconductors and micro-wiring represent possible systemic
innovations. There are limitations associated with making chips smaller with the current
materials, and this requires a complete change of technological paradigm to other materials
such as copper, plastics and gels from aluminium and silicon dioxide, but these are unknown
(and therefore pre-paradigmatic) areas. Copper-based wiring technologies are also in quadrant
B, because although they have been developed, they are still highly tacit and pre-
paradigmatic. Plastics and gels as insulators are in quadrant A, because they are as yet
impractical, and little further than promising concepts.
Differentiating between quadrant A and B, is difficult, because they are 'new'
technologies and new trajectories within technologies. These industries share certain
characteristics: neither the dominant technological trajectory is known, nor indeed the
objective. The technology is highly tacit, and not necessarily commercial. It is important to
emphasise that we are speaking of technologies and practical research outcomes, rather than
products. Take the case of battery technology. Although there has undoubtedly been vast
improvements in the technology, the basic paradigm underlying stored electrical energy has
not changed dramatically in the 200 years since Volta. There is slow technical change taking
places within the old technological paradigm - that of chemical batteries. It would thus be in
quadrant D. There are new technological trajectories (such as fuel cells), but because they are
new and commercially unproven, the outcome of the selection process is unknown, so it is
impossible to determine ex ante whether the research outcome is in quadrant A or B. Which
of these trajectories will be the commercially successful one is also unknown. So until a
trajectory becomes 'established' as a dominant one, it is uncertain whether technical change is
rapid or not. What we are trying to suggest here is that technical change and innovation
cannot be viewed from an entirely scientific perspective, but also from its viability from a
commercial point of view.
At the other extreme of technical change are most metal technologies (steel,
aluminium, etc) - these are slowly-evolving and mature technologies which demonstrate
minor but consistent innovations over time, and can be regarded as post-paradigmatic. Thus
they are located in Quadrant D. The technology is to a great extent codifiable, widely
disseminated, and the property rights are well-defined. Innovation is rarely patentable in these
technologies, where applications development account for most innovatory activity.16
Competition shifts towards price, economies of scale, and downstream activities in order to
add value, as the original product is priced as a commodity.
Dynamic aspects of choosing between in-house R&D, alliances and outsourcing
How does this relate to the use of non-internal modes of technology sourcing? It is
clear from the preceding review of fundamental concepts that the choice between non-internal
and internal R&D (and within non-internal activities, between outsourcing and alliances) is a
complex  process. We focus on two main questions. First, how does the use of non-internal
sourcing vary by industry? Second, how do technologies change over time, and how does this
affect the use of internal and non-internal sources?
The main issue here would seem to be the stage of evolution of the distinctive
competences of the firm. This is the reason that there is considerable overlap in figure 2
between in-house R&D, outsourcing and alliances. Take the case where the products and the
distinctive technologies that underlie it are pre-paradigmatic, that is, they are in quadrant A/B.
technologies that relate to it are likely to be tacit, and competition to create a de facto standard
and establish a paradigm is high. A firm in such a market segment will try, as much as
possible, to keep its niche and distinctive competences in-house, but support these with
alliances wherever necessary, particularly for strategic reasons. It will seek to establish
alliances with competitors to create standards, as well as with suppliers to establish a
dominant design. Even in marginal and peripheral sectors of competence, it is important to
develop long-term relationships with firms so as to establish these firms' products as dominant
designs. The establishment of a dominant design is also enhanced by the entry of number
complementary and peripheral products, which depend on compatibility. Take the example of
the hand-held computer (HPC) manufacturer, Psion. In order to establish its operating system
(Symbiant) as the standard, it has established alliances with the four largest mobile telephone
manufacturers (Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola and Matsushita). The merger of mobile telephony
with computing is as yet (circa 1999) a nascent idea, and it represents a peripheral technology
to both parties, but one which all concerned believe will dramatically change their distinctive
competences. The rival operating systems
9 and designs have each been engaged in the same
attempt to create a 'critical mass' of peripheral device manufacturers and to establish
                                                       
9 Microsoft is promoting its Windows CE as the standard, both for HPCs and PDAs, but unlike Psion, does not
manufacture its own hardware. It has established alliances with AT&T, Philips, Sharp, Hewlett Packard, among
others. A rival operating system is offered by 3Com, which only works with PDAs, and which they have
preferred to keep proprietary.17
standards. However, the battle is not simply over operating systems, but also between
hardware systems.
The preference, however, for in-house R&D for distinctive and niche competences,
supported by alliances, is only where radical changes or new technologies might have a
systemic effect on their distinct competences. Figure 5 gives the decision tree that would
ordinarily face a company that has to decide how to allocate resources for a new pre-
paradigmatic technology. For instance, where the new technology has an autonomous effect
on its competitiveness - in the case of Psion, say, new battery technology (slow technical
change) - and multiple substitutable sources are available, outsourcing is undertaken (see
figure 5).  However, standards for mobile telephony and related technology are central to
Psion's competitiveness. This is an area where standards are almost paradigmatic (only two
set of standards remain in contention), but not quite (quadrant B).  It will have a systemic
effect on its existing assets, so the firm is obliged to conduct in-house R&D in combination
with alliances (figure 5).
*******FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE*******
For firms for whom core products technology is in quadrant C, where a dominant
paradigm is established, more technologies can be outsourced, and more areas of niche
competences can be undertaken though alliances Figure 6 gives the corresponding decision
tree that firms face. However, there are two aspects to engaging in alliances in quadrant C
technologies. On the one hand, the technology is fast-evolving, and although nominally
property rights protection exists, patenting is often a limited source of competitive advantage
given the rapidity of change. Firms do not always have recourse to patenting as a means to
protect new and rapidly evolving technologies, and must rely on secrecy, or on lead-time
10, or
by co-inventing with a potential competitors (Levin et al 1987). As noted in a survey of
European firms, the propensity to patent new products averaged 35.9% across sectors, and
24.8% in process innovations  (Arundel and Kabla 1998). The need for secrecy, combined
with the rapidity of change means that, where the technology is a niche or distinctive one,
ceteris paribus, firms will choose in-house R&D.  On the other hand, the rapidity of technical
change and the high costs of innovation may lead to alliance activity. Take the situation where
two firms in the same industry are pursuing an important new breakthrough independently.
Neither can be certain that they will win the race to innovate. As such, it may be in their best
                                                       
10 Where the innovator attempts to get the product to market before competitors, with enough lead time, such
that by the time they imitate, the first innovator has progressed to a newer and better product.18
interest to collaborate, thus ensuring both that they are jointly 'first': half a pie may be
considered better in conditions of uncertainty while there is a probability that there may be
none at all (Narula 1999).
*******FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE*******
Technologies also evolve in their importance to the firm. Figure 7 shows several
technologies for firm B which shifted in importance over time, and moved from one kind of
competence to another (illustrated by arrows). For instance, until recently, PCB design was
done in-house. The design of double-sided printed circuit boards had required a high level of
skills, but recent software design products for PCs had become so powerful, and the
knowledge to do so quite diffused, that this was no longer a complex task. Thus, design could
now be outsourced.
*******FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE*******
Once a dominant design establishes itself, a technology that may have been a
distinctive competence may in fact be peripheral, or even background. For instance, in the
case of firm B, in the early 1980s, the operating system was considered a crucial technology
and a distinctive competence (figure 7). This was a technology that was fiercely guarded, and
on which almost 20% of its R&D resources were invested. By the late 1980s, it had become a
niche sector. It had become easier to hire programmers skilful in OS development, and
although the OS was still seen as crucial, fewer resources (less than 10%) were devoted to it-
essentially a niche sector. By the late 1990s, although the OS remains crucial to their
competitiveness, they no longer have to maintain a proprietary OS, since a dominant design
(Windows) exists, for which considerable off-the-shelf software is available, a high level of
competence at developing customised versions of the OS and software can be easily (and
cheaply) accessed from consultants. Less than 5% of their resources are spent on software
development as a whole, and most of their requirements were  either outsourced, or developed
within an alliance. There are now no R&D staff that are engaged full-time in software design
or development.  PCB design has also demonstrated a similar shift (see figure 7), going from
a niche technology to a marginal one, while PCB manufacture has progressed from a niche
competence to a background one, and is now completely outsourced.
It is important to note that it is not always possible to determine ex ante whether an
innovation will have a systemic effect of an autonomous one. Take the situation where a new
technology may threaten the distinctive competences of a firm, but the area of innovation is19
pre-paradigmatic (in quadrant A) and the potential benefits or effects on current competences
are still highly uncertain- say gene therapy for a pharmaceuticals company. Such an area of
innovation can be pursued independently from other innovations, it will more likely undertake
this through non-internal means. Where the expected benefit of the new area of research is
still unknown, the firm will not be interested in investing large internal resources, until the
potential benefits are more tangible, a risk-reduction strategy through collaboration is most
often viable (Mitchell and Singh 1992). However complete externalisation is impossible,
since the nature of the output is unknown. In the case of biotechnology, large pharmaceutical
firms rresolved this by acquiring a minority stake in small, start-up biotech firms. This gave
the large firms an 'option' to acquire (and thus internalise) or otherwise control the research
output of the small firm were the technology to develop a practical value to them. If the
research outcome proves to be not commercially viable or not the prevailing technological
paradigm, the relatively low costs of this strategy are not a matter of great concern. However,
this is not an option that presents itself for smaller firms with limited resources. In addition,
property rights protection is as yet undetermined - for instance, the question of cloning and
gene manipulation research output is still an area of some controversy. Property right
protection is thus achieved through secrecy, and collaborative research therefore is a risky
option.
Where property rights are clearly defined, technical change is slow and uncertainty is
low, (quadrant D), non-internal R&D options are least risky - completely external
technological outsourcing is feasible. Competitive advantage in these industries generally
derives not from technology per se, where the products are 'generic', but from marketing and
economies of scale. Indeed, firm E which is engaged in a natural-resource extracting sector,
explained:
"We have nothing to hide. We believe in sharing all our technologies, because we
don’t really have anything special. There isn't much that our competitors don’t already have,
and its really a small circle - everyone knows everyone else - we have all been in this industry
a long time. Things change very slowly, and we make most of our profits from downstream
activities. Maybe our core asset is our marketing and logistics department."
Indeed, with very low R&D intensities, much of the research by such companies is
done with universities, and in collaboration with equipment suppliers. Another firm E
manager explained,
"If there is a new environmental standard, its good for us. We have to design new
machinery or adapt existing equipment for our major customers. It means more orders. But it
also means we have to make the R&D investment. If we don't, a competitor will, and they will20
get all the orders. Margins are tight, because we have a long-term relationship, so we never
question the wisdom [of subsidising the R&D of customers]. "
The need for alliances and more formal interaction between buyers and suppliers, then,
is considerably reduced, since a high level of trust and interdependence exists. Likewise,
because technology changes only very slowly, quick response alliance modes such as non-
equity agreements are not at all popular (Hagedoorn and Narula 1996).  As such, outsourcing
is often the most preferred option. Figure 8 summarises the decision tree for quadrant D
industries.
*******FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE*******
Some conclusions, caveats and avenues for future research
This paper has tried to develop an understanding of some of the technological and
economic factors that underlie how firms choose between in-house R&D, R&D alliances and
outsourcing.  We have develop our framework along two lines. First, we have examined how
firms choose between these three modes in a static situation. That is, given a firm's
distribution of competencies, and the availability of alternatives, it is possible to determine,
ceteris paribus, which technologies will be undertaken in-house, and for which technologies
firms are more likely to use non-internal means. We have used some anecdotal data based on
interviews to lend support to our framework.  There is, of course, considerable variation
between technologies, depending upon whether they are pre-paradigmatic, paradigmatic or
post-paradigmatic. In addition, technologies evolve over time, and new innovations external
to the firm may have to be absorbed, and utilised within the existing technological portfolio of
the firm.
Thus, our second objective has been to develop a framework that examines these
dynamic issues, based in part on the pioneering efforts of Teece (1986, 1996). We have
argued that the choice between these three organisational modes varies with the maturity of
the technological paradigm and the distribution of technological competences of the firm. In
addition, as changes take place in the maturity of the technology, the choice of mode will
change. Furthermore, new technologies may be introduced into the firm's portfolio of
competencies, and the choice of mode is also determined by its having a systemic or an
autonomous effect on the firms existing technologies.
Obviously, firms are path-dependent, and idiosyncratic. We do not claim that our
analysis is by any means exhaustive, or necessarily more than guidelines about how firms21
might behave when it comes to decisions about non-internal R&D activities. We would go so
far as to say that our analysis and discussion simply points towards some general trends,
rather hard and fast rules about the choices open to firms.
Indeed, in developing our discussion, we are only too aware of the large number of
caveats that apply to our models. There are numerous strategic and economic issues that have
not been included in our arguments, strongly supported by anecdotal information acquired
from the interviews. We shall endeavour to highlight some of these here, which need to be
considered in future work.
Perhaps the single most important variable that seems to be ignored in much of the
literature,  is the issue of firm size, and the consequent limited resources these firms are able
to invest in R&D. The pressure to innovate and to master multiple technologies applies to
firms of all sizes. Clearly, outsourcing and alliances provides an opportunity for small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to have access to capabilities they ordinarily might not be
able to afford, or to justify a higher-than-industry-average R&D intensity to top management.
This use of outsourcing to 'smooth out' cyclical variations in demand has been noted also by
Buckley and Chapman (1998: 373). As Firm C noted,
"building up [research capacity in a new area] takes time. 1-2 years to hire 5-6
qualified researchers, and to work as a team. It is justifiable when times are good, but
we can't just lay researchers off when times are hard. We have to keep them on, or we
demoralise the whole department."
This strategy, it should be noted, was used by large companies too. Firm D noted of its
customers,
"They use us as a valve. When times are good, they give us more design
projects, and more orders. When times are hard, we are told to cut costs [before they
do]."
Indeed, SMEs may utilise non-internal means to a greater extent than large firms, not just
because it allows them to have access to and/or master new technologies, but also because
they themselves are often dependent on larger firms as customers. Large firms have the
resources to commercialise production of products and processes involving new technologies,
and can afford the high capital costs needed to achieve the necessary market penetration, since
the marginal cost of using their existing facilities is low. Small firms often have no choice to
be involved in close-knitted alliances with large firms. Although our data is by no means
representative, SMEs tend to engage in fewer horizontal alliances with other SMEs.22
It should be noted that there is a lower limit to the extent to which any firm (but
particularly SMEs) can use non-internal sources as a substitute for internal R&D. Both
alliances and outsourcing require complementary resources. Some level of in-house capacity
is essential to absorb the externally acquired information. Furthermore, alliances in particular
require considerable managerial resources, not just because of the collaborative aspect, but
also because alliances tend to be used where technology is tacit
Firms also determine their R&D strategies based on purely strategic rationale, in order
to improve their long-term product-market positioning. We suggest four of the more
important reasons. First, as Kay (1997) explains, 'it is necessary to engage in networks with
certain firms not because they trust their partners, but in order to trust their partners' (Kay
1997: 215). When companies decide to seek cost-savings in an innovatory process (or any
other high cost/high risk project), its makes sense to do so with a partner with whom no free-
rider dangers exist. In other words, although it is impossible to be certain about the outcome
of an alliance, there is a higher probability that where trust has been created in a previous
alliance, the new alliance is more likely to be successful.
Second, there is the follow-the-leader strategy, as originally highlighted by
Knickerbocker (1973). Firms seek partnerships in response to similar moves made by other
firms in the same industry, not always because there are sound economic rationale in doing
so, but in imitation of their competitors.
Third, firms sometimes partner with unknown partners with uncertain or unproven
technologies rather than successful players. Why would a potential partner wish to collaborate
with another which has limited or as-yet-undemonstrated resources to offer?
i. because of the nature of innovation, the only way to determine the nature of a
potential partner's research efforts is to examine them. One way it can do so is
by engaging in some form of mutual hostage exchange, which an alliance
provides.
ii. even where the partner's resources prove to be of a limited or inappropriate
nature, and the alliance is terminated prematurely, information about its former
partner's competencies are then available to either firm in future periods,
should it require competencies similar to those on offer by its ex-partner.
iii. as Hagedoorn and Duysters (1997) have argued, while selecting partners that
are well-established players in existing technologies may represent profit
maximising situation, it is optimal only in a static environment. In a dynamic
environment, where there is a possibility of technological change (or even a23
change in technological trajectories), having ties to a wide group of companies,
including companies that have yet to demonstrate their value, represents a
higher learning potential.
Fourth, the high rate of failure of alliances and their inherent instability (Inkpen and
Beamish 1997) means that it is a good idea to have redundant agreements - not all agreements
will be successful for all parties concerned, and in addition to allowing firms to discover what
cards their competitors have up their sleeves, it permits them to 'learn about learning' and the
art of managing alliances.
We have not discussed the differences in types of partners, and how this may effect the
choice between internal and external R&D. Universities, for instance, are regarded in a
different way in terms of trust than commercial enterprises. Firms often undertake more
'sensitive' research at arms-length with universities than with other firms. However, this may
simply reflect the tendency for firms to undertake more basic (and therefore tacit) activity
with universities. Tidd and Trehwalla (1997), for instance, observe that universities are the
most widely used external source of technology, although this may varies quite considerably
across countries (Granstand 1998), and across industries.
All these issues are important, and deserve far more attention than has been given
here. Nonetheless, we feel that the two frameworks developed here allow both firms and
policy makers to consider the significance of the options available to them. In addition, they
can be useful in assisting in making more rational decisions, and to evaluate the implications
of the type of R&D investment, in addition to the amount of investment, on
long term competitiveness.24
Appendix A
The anecdotal evidence cited here derives from a larger ongoing survey being conducted on
the internationalisation of R&D by European based MNEs. Currently, over 100 firms have
been surveyed, through mailed questionnaire surveys and 32 firm interviews.  The criteria for
selection of these firms has been a) That they were majority-European owned as of 1998, b)
engaged in manufacturing, c) have annual R&D expenditures greater than (approximately)
US$1 million and/or 10 full-time R&D employees. All interviews were conducted with the
head of the R&D department or vice-president of technology development, or equivalent. In
case of multi-divisional firms, interviews were conducted with several divisions, and
occasionally from various levels. Detailed information on internal and external activities were
not collected through the questionnaire survey, which was undertaken during 1998, and was
only undertaken during the interviews, conducted after the survey. In all interviews, without
exception, the interviewees expressed concern about the sensitive nature of the information
provided, and have insisted on confidentiality. Therefore, given the relatively small sample
size, and the very specific nature of their products and competences, and the small number of
firms in each industry, it is difficult to give statistical overview regarding our sample, without
breaching confidentiality.
We have used the interview material along the lines of a unorthodox case-study
analysis to illustrate our arguments, by amalgamating  firms that have similar technological
activities into fictitious firms, so as to prevent any single firm from being identified.  We give
a brief overview of these here.  We have attempted to match 'similar' firms together, in terms
of technology intensity, primary technologies, size and distribution of international activities,
but not nationality, structure of ownership or age of firms.  In addition, some amalgamations
include a division of a large multinational conglomerate. In such cases, we have excluded
certain details which might reveal the identity of the parent firm, and therefore the firm in
question.
We use the terms alliances and outsourcing as understood and used in relation to the MERIT-
CATI database (see Narula and Hagedoorn 1999). By outsourcing we take to mean
agreements that are more arms-length in nature, where active collaboration does not take
place. There is generally a clear customer-supplier relationship, and no joint innovative
activity takes place, although coordination for systems integration may be undertaken.
Alliances are taken to be agreements where there is a clear, significant, and systematic25
interdependence between the parties involved, with both firms undertaking innovative
activities.
Firm A
Medical equipment manufacturer (amalgam of 2 firms).  400-700 employees, 40-70 R&D
employees.  No overseas production, centralised R&D activities. Both firms are
industry-leaders in their products.
Firm B
Measurement and industrial control equipment (amalgam of 4 firms). - between a 800 and
2000 employees, 40-100 employees in R&D department. Centralised R&D facilities.
All four companies have a dominant position in their market segment (varying from
15% to 60% of world-wide market share in their market segment).
Firm C
Transportation equipment component manufacturer (amalgam of 3 companies).  Primarily
supplies sub-assemblies to three or four major manufacturers.  R&D department of
division between 100 and 200  employees. Part of a large transportation equipment
manufacturer. Overall employee number is confidential.
Firm D
Office equipment manufacturer, sells under its own brand name, no OEM activity (amalgam
of 2 companies).  One primary product range, R&D activity in several countries,
between 400 and 1000 R&D employees.  Both firms are among top-three players in
their industry
Firm E
Resource-intensive firm (amalgam of 4 companies). Includes 2 paper and wood products
companies and two metals industries firms (fabrication divisions excluded).  All firms
included are large (greater than 5000 employees)26
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Figure 1: The distribution of a competences
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Note: No attempt has been made to locate technologies on a relative basis within any given quadrant.
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rights well defined.  E.g.,
automobiles, steel,34
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Note: No attempt has been made to locate technologies on a relative basis within any given quadrant.



















Figure 8 - decision tree in selecting mode of R&D for post-paradigmatic technology
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